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Introduction 
Vacant, abandoned, and blighted properties have troubled comm-
unities for decades, starting with foreclosures caused by “flipping”1  
1. Flippers are purchasers who buy cheap properties, often in various states 
of disrepair, with the intention of quickly reselling them for a small profit. 
See Margaret Dewar, Eric Seymour & Oana Druta, Disinvesting in the City: 
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schemes in the early 1970s.2 The mortgage crisis in 2007, however, 
created “unprecedented surges in vacant homes across many metro-
politan areas, including regions that had not experienced significant 
vacancy problems earlier.”3 Between 2000 and 2010, vacant housing in 
the United States increased by 4.5 million, or forty-four percent.4 Va-
cant properties are not only visually problematic: vacant properties 
cause surrounding properties to decline in value and fall into disrepair, 
and vacant properties encourage criminal behavior in the declining nei-
ghborhoods.5 These properties may have become vacant for a variety of 
reasons, one of which being overwhelming tax debt.6 
A tax-delinquent property is not an immediate source of blight, but 
tax delinquency can carry over onto the financial value of the surround-
ing homes.7 “The untimely payment of property tax bills is another 
form of financial distress, and delinquent property taxes are likely to 
cause negative spillovers on nearby properties that are similar to [mort-
gage] foreclosures.”8 Because of this, tax-collecting governments must 
 
The Role of Tax Foreclosure in Detroit, 51 Urb. Aff. Rev. 587, 605 (2015) 
(describing how buyers act as “flippers” when they purchase foreclosed 
properties at auctions then resell their purchases at a higher price). 
2. Dan Immergluck, Yun Sang Lee & Patrick Tarranova, Local 
Vacant Property Registration Ordinances in the U.S.: An Analysis 
of Growth, Regional Trends, and Some Key Characteristics 5 (2012). 
3. Id. 
4. Alan Mallach, Brookings Inst., Laying the Groundwork for 
Change: Demolition, Urban Strategy, and Policy Reform 3 (2012). 
5. Vacant properties can cause surrounding properties to lose $7,627 in value 
on average and cause $73 million in property damage due to fire each year. 
Patrick Gunton, Detroit’s Vacant Property Dilemma: The Illusory Power of 
Demolition Statutes in a Post-“Great Recession” World, 59 Wayne L. Rev. 
119, 121 (2013) (citing Joseph Schilling, Code Enforcement and Community 
Stabilization: The Forgotten First Responders to Vacant and Foreclosed 
Homes, 2 Alb. Gov’t L. Rev. 101, 110–12 (2009)). 
6. See Thomas Gunton, Coping with the Specter of Urban Malaise in a Post-
modern Landscape: The Need for a Detroit Land Bank Authority, 84 U. Det. 
Mercy L. Rev. 521, 521–23 (2007) (explaining how vacant properties 
decrease property values and, consequently, lower revenue from taxes); 
Gunton, supra note 5, at 133–34 (describing the community and municipal 
costs of vacant properties). 
7. See Stephan Whitaker & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, The Impact of Vacant, 
Tax-Delinquent, and Foreclosed Property on Sales Prices of Neighboring 
Homes 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 1123R, 2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1935510 [https:// 
perma.cc/KB57-P5VJ] (finding that a vacant or delinquent property within 
500 feet of a home reduces the home’s selling price by approximately 1.4 
percent, with a negative impact of four percent in low-poverty areas). 
8. James Alm, Zackary Hawley, Jin Man Lee & Joshua J. Miller, 
Property Tax Delinquency and its Spillover Effects on Nearby 
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find solutions to tax delinquency and blight that encourage repayment 
of at least some of the lost tax revenue and provide an enforceable way 
to ensure renovation and repair to blighted properties, but that also 
avoid the creation of undue hardship, such as home loss, for financially 
troubled homeowners. 
Local governments use tax foreclosures as an opportunity to reclaim 
delinquent, problem properties and attempt to put them to more pro-
ductive use, whether by directing the properties to a land bank program 
or by reselling the properties to new owners.9 When tax-foreclosed prop-
erties are put to sale, local governments have an opportunity to recoup 
some of the lost tax revenue.10 Because local governments manage 
property-tax collection through authority given by state statute and 
local procedures, the processes vary widely from place to place, as do 
the rates of successful collection.11 Tax foreclosure and foreclosure sales 
serve as tools to redirect problem properties. However, when used in 
troubled housing markets, those same procedures may merely send 
problem properties from one irresponsible owner to another.12 Because 
tax delinquency and foreclosure are strong indicators of blight and dis-
tress in a neighborhood,13 government involvement in shaping tax fore-
closure programs is particularly important in cities facing depopulation 
and decreased housing demand.14 Local governments generally put 
 
Properties 1 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2507049 [https://perma.cc/US2Y-U7CN]. 
9. See William Weber, Comment, Tax Foreclosure: A Drag on Community 
Vitality or a Tool for Economic Growth?, 81 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1615, 1630–31 
(2013) (suggesting economically productive uses for tax delinquent and aband-
oned properties). 
10. See Jenny Wilkes Robertson, Recent Case, Jones v. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 1780 
(2006), 30 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 179, 179 (2007) (describing how 
local governments seize delinquent taxpayers’ property to generate revenue). 
11. Daniel J. Hammel & Sujata Shetty, Complexity and Change in the Foreclosure 
Process in Toledo, Ohio, 23 Hous. Policy Debate no. 1, 2013 at 35–36 (2013). 
12. See, e.g., Christine MacDonald, Detroit Area Investor Gains from Others’ 
Real Estate Mistakes, Detroit News (Feb. 3, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www. 
detroitnews.com/article/20110203/METRO01/102030368 [https://perma.cc/ 
WNM8-ZBF2] (describing how auction buyers, including some real estate in-
vestors, manipulate the foreclosure process at the local community’s expense). 
13. Nigel G. Griswold, Benjamin Calnin, Michael Schramm, Luc Anselin 
& Paul Boehnlein, W. Reserve Land Conservancy Thriving Cmtys. 
Inst., Estimating the Effect of Demolishing Distressed Structures 
in Cleveland, OH, 2009–2013: Impacts on Real Estate Equity and 
Mortgage-Foreclosure 8 [hereinafter Thriving Communities Report] 
(noting that there are various forms of distress indicators, including mortgage-
foreclosure, tax-foreclosure, tax-delinquency, and vacancy, which have differ-
ent impacts on property values). 
14. Dewar, Seymour & Druta, supra note 1, at 588–89. 
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considerable effort into processes for obtaining and selling properties, 
but greater issues may arise following that sale.15 “A decision to 
maximize income through the sale of city-owned property to the highest 
bidder may offer short-term financial benefits but choke off develop-
ment opportunities offering substantially greater benefits in the long 
run. . . . [D]isposition policies should still balance their immediate fiscal 
demands against long-term goals.”16 This is particularly true when fore-
closure auctions offer properties for minimum bids below the outstand-
ing tax balance due. Purchasers may walk away with properties they 
are either unprepared to cope with (e.g., significant blight requiring 
extensive repairs, high future property tax liabilities in comparison to 
the minimal initial purchase price), or purchasers may obtain properties 
with negative intentions (e.g., plans to milk property value by renting 
out the property without making repairs or paying taxes).17 
A variety of individuals purchase properties from local government 
tax foreclosure sales. Some individuals use these auctions as a means to 
purchase affordable homes to live in, while others purchase the proper-
ties as investments.18 Mallach divides these investors into a few groups: 
“Rehabbers” purchase poor-condition properties, fix them up, and sell 
them to homebuyers; “flippers” purchase similarly distressed properties 
to sell, but do not fix any of the issues and often engage in misleading 
 
15. See Alan Mallach, Bringing Buildings Back: From Abandoned 
Properties to Community Assets 103 (2006) (“Although local officials 
often devote considerable time and energy to framing property acquisition 
policies, few pay equal attention to seeing that their property disposition 
policies effectively further the community’s redevelopment goals.”). 
16. Id. at 103. 
17. See Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 Ind. L.J. 
747, 749 (2000) (explaining how property buyers are sometimes unable to 
afford property taxes on their purchases); see also Alan Mallach, Local 
Initiatives Support Coal., Meeting the Challenge of Distressed 
Property Investors in America’s Neighborhoods 11 (2010) (explaining 
how the cost of obtaining and maintaining a property to rent as compared to 
the rental income could persuade some property buyers to skip renovations 
and other responsibilities in favor of milking property value until they dump 
the property). 
18. The types of properties that end up in these auctions vary as well. For example, 
the famous Packard Plant in Detroit was subject to an auction purchase that 
ended up falling through, causing some commentators to suggest certain 
properties should never be sent to auction in the first place. Instead, those 
properties might be better served by direct transfer to a land bank. See Nancy 
Kaffer, Blame Packard Plant Auction Debacle on Broken System, Detroit 
Free Press (Oct. 31, 2013, 1:16 PM), http://archive.freep.com/article/ 
20131030/COL43/310300122/packard-plant-auction-van-horn-texas-doctor- 
detroit [https://perma.cc/5QUH-Y42B] (noting Wayne County’s Deputy 
Treasurer David Szymanski saw the reverter plan as a solution to these types 
of problems). 
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behavior to make the sale;19 “milkers” purchase distressed properties, 
make few changes to the condition, and rent the homes out;20 and 
“holders” purchase properties to rent out in fairly good condition.21 All 
of these types of foreclosure-sale buyers have the potential to impact 
areas struggling with foreclosure.22 While rehabbers and holders would 
likely best benefit a property, these individuals are much harder to att-
ract to urban Rust Belt properties, as the necessary renovations on 
these distressed properties will often cost more than the increase in the 
property value.23 “In those cities or neighborhoods where most investors 
are flippers or milkers, a case can be made that their activities at most 
delay abandonment for a year or two, while perpetuating dangerous 
and unhealthy conditions.”24 Bulk buyers, though easily assumed to be 
flippers or milkers, may fall within any of these categories.25 In most 
cases, tax-collecting governments would rather see properties sell at 
auction to new taxpayers than sit empty, but Mallach suggests sitting 
empty would be preferable to ownership by some of these more trouble-
some buyers.26 Mallach recommends setting ground rules for responsible 
investment in these communities rather than cutting investors out of 
the picture altogether. Not all investors will act irresponsibly, and it 
may create more damage to block all investors than to manage the 
problematic ones.27 
 
19. Flippers are common in the Detroit-area auctions—of a sample of properties 
purchased in the auction between 2002 and 2008, twenty-five percent had 
been resold at least once within the first twelve months since the auction, and 
several more had been resold more than once. Dewar, Seymour & Druta, supra 
note 1, at 605. 
20. Other kinds of holders purchase properties solely to interfere with upcoming 
projects for their own financial gain, such as the owner of the only bridge from 
Detroit to Canada who purchased property that had been planned for use for 
a new bridge, just to delay the new project. Id. at 606. 
21. Mallach, supra note 17, at 10. 
22. Id. at 12. 
23. See id. at 11 (“[Rust Belt] properties are more likely to attract milkers, who 
spend little on maintenance, ignore property tax bills, and are able to recoup 
their investment in short order.”).  
24. Id. at 14. 
25. See, e.g., Dewar, Seymour & Druta, supra note 1, at 605 (describing anecdotally 
one bulk buyer that rehabbed auction properties and then made them available 
on a rent-to-own basis for homeowners, as compared to Detroit’s “notorious 
slumlords” who would buy auction properties to rent them without improve-
ments to low-income tenants). 
26. See Mallach, supra note 17, at 14–15 (arguing that, in some cities, it may 
be better for a property to remain vacant rather than purchased by flippers 
or milkers, who are likely to perpetuate dangerous and unhealthy conditions). 
27. Id. 
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The procedures vary widely, but tax delinquent properties will al-
most always go through a process that includes forfeiture, foreclosure, 
and subsequent sale or transfer. These sales are almost always auctions, 
whether in person or online.28 When dealing in large quantities of low-
price properties, tax-collecting the potential cycle of blight emanating 
from the initial tax foreclosure sale, tax-collecting governments must 
either target problem purchasers before selling tax foreclosed properties 
or create mechanisms to police buyer behavior following the sale. Using 
the long-standing property doctrine of possibilities of reverter, quick-
moving local governments may be able to effectively force out problem 
buyers after the sale. This practice, however, will not translate well to 
tax-collecting governments managing large foreclosure sales with high 
incidents of delinquency. If a government is going to use a possibility 
of reverter for tax foreclosure tales, the tax-collecting government must 
write its deed clearly to prevent disputes about its meaning, comm-
unicate clearly with the public about the reverter procedure and the 
conditions that trigger the reverter, and maintain sufficient resources 
to reclaim the property quickly and decisively when any of the trigger-
ing conditions are met. For many governments, managing a reverter 
program is just not realistic. In such a case, presale limitations and 
restrictions on buyers provide more easily managed alternatives that 
can still help to curb delinquency post-sale. Successful implementation 
of these programs would require the state legislature to pass enabling 
legislation, along with strong county or municipal leadership to create 
on-the-ground procedures based on the state’s collection options. 
This Note will examine the Wayne County’s novel use of a reverter 
plan in its postauction tactics, along with its preauction tactics, to 
suggest when and how other local governments may successfully apply 
similar programs to their own problems with blight and delinquency 
following tax auctions. This Note will also consider from a practical, 
policy perspective whether reverter programs are actually the best 
choice for local governments struggling with vacant, blighted, and tax 
delinquent properties. Because Wayne County took such a drastic mea-
sure to combat tax delinquency and blight in such an accelerated pro-
cess, this Note focuses on the economic climate and policy of Wayne 
County in analyzing the legality and policy considerations of a tax fore-
closure reverter clause. However, other cities grapple with similar issues 
of bulk buying, absentee landlords, and homeowners simply unable to 
afford property tax payments.29 As such, a thorough examination of the 
implications of the plan within the Wayne County and its existing tax 
 
28. Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness 
and Efficiency of Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 639, 643–48 (1997) (explaining the basic types of foreclosures). 
29. See, e.g., Dewar, Seymour & Druta, supra note 1, at 605 (providing an example 
of bulk buyers behaving irresponsibly with properties purchased from Sheriff’s 
sales). 
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foreclosure procedures will help in determining whether the reverter 
program might be replicated in other local government systems. 
I. Tax Collection, Delinquency, and Foreclosure 
To discuss local responses to tax auction buyers, it is helpful to 
understand the procedure through which ordinary properties find their 
way into foreclosure and to auction. This Part details the property tax 
and foreclosure activities in Wayne County, Michigan as those proced-
ures apply to the County’s reverter plan and presale delinquency-
prevention programs. 
A. Property Tax Problems in Wayne County, Michigan 
Wayne County, Michigan, home to Detroit, has coped with blight 
and sinking tax revenues for quite some time.30 One Michigan researcher 
described the foreclosure crisis as “‘unprecedented in our lifetimes, to 
have so many properties going through foreclosure in Wayne County 
and all over Michigan,’”31 and explained that such a serious crisis re-
quires “‘the right mix of responses.’”32 An estimated 78,000 vacant and 
blighted properties sit within the City of Detroit alone.33 As of January 
2014, forty-eight percent of Detroit’s properties were tax delinquent, 
leaving twenty percent of the City’s total tax revenues uncollected.34 
Wayne County has recently implemented progressive programs to try 
to address these problems before, during, and after its tax foreclosure 
sale. These programs serve as helpful examples for other communities. 
Although Wayne County’s vacant property problems are much larger 
than those found in other communities, the causes and consequences of 
 
30. Gunton, supra note 6, at 524. 
31. Bill Laitner, Tax-Foreclosure Crisis Looming as Lawmakers Set to Act, 
Detroit Free Press (Nov. 29, 2014, 12:13 AM), http://www.freep.com/ 
story/news/local/michigan/wayne/2014/11/29/detroit-wayne-county-
property-tax-foreclosures-evictions-bills-interest-mike-duggan-rick-snyder-
evictions/19639265/ [https://perma.cc/9QT2-ULXF] (quoting Eric Lupher, 
president of the Citizens Research Council of Michigan, a nonprofit think 
tank in Livonia). 
32. Id. 
33. David Muller, Wayne County Treasurer Expects up to 10,000 Metro Detroit 
Properties to Be Sold in Auction, Mich. Live (Oct. 22, 2013, 10:35 AM), 
http://www.mlive.com/business/detroit/index.ssf/2013/10/wayne_county 
_treasurer_expects.html [https://perma.cc/7J64-SUPX]. 
34. James Alm, Timothy R. Hodge, Gary Sands & Mark Skidmore, Property 
Tax Delinquency—Social Contract in Crisis: The Case of Detroit 2 (Victoria 
Univ. of Wellington, Working Paper No. 05/2014, 2014), http://research 
archive.vuw.ac.nz/handle/10063/3149 [https://perma.cc/2EVB-FTCE]. 
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the problems are true for nearly every city battling blight and tax delin-
quency.35 Wayne County deals with significantly higher numbers of 
delinquency and abandonment than many other communities,36 but it 
is not dealing with a unique problem. 
For some communities, tax foreclosure and subsequent auction is a 
means to reclaim lost income and reestablish the income streams from 
previously delinquent properties. For many of Wayne County’s proper-
ties, this has not been the case. Wayne County has been unlikely to see 
any tax payments from the purchasers in its tax foreclosure auctions: 
Seventy-eight percent of the properties sold in the auctions since 2011 
fell back into delinquency by 2014. Starting in 2011, Wayne County 
included a “reverter” clause in its tax foreclosure auction deeds to allow 
local governments to break the cycle of blight and bring recently pur-
chased tax-foreclosed properties back to productive use if the new 
purchasers fail to meet their responsibilities. In June 2014, the Wayne 
County treasurer sued to enforce those reverter clauses on over 20,000 
tax-delinquent or condemned auction sale properties,37 and the Wayne 
County Third Circuit Court granted the treasurer’s request.38 This tac-
tic has rarely been used by a tax-collecting government agency to com-
bat tax delinquency and blight, particularly on such a large scale. 
B. Wayne County’s Basic Tax Collection Procedures 
While tax collection and foreclosure procedures vary widely from 
state to state and by local government units within states, Wayne 
 
35. In 2013, Detroit’s property tax delinquency rate was forty-eight percent. 
Philadelphia’s tax delinquency rate two years earlier was nineteen percent. 
Delinquencies this high can force local governments to cut back services or 
raise taxes to balance the losses. Alm, Hawley, Lee & Miller, supra note 
8, at 3. 
36. See Karen Weise, A Surprising Bid for a Blighted Slice of Detroit, Businessweek 
(Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-10-30/detroit- 
blight-bundle-draws-surprising-bid [https://perma.cc/8UZB-ESDD] (describing 
the thousands of foreclosed homes in Detroit that Wayne County seeks to sell 
or destroy). 
37. Marlon A. Walker, Wayne County Treasurer Suing to Recover Homes of 
Tax Scofflaws, Detroit Free Press (June 23, 2014), http://archive.freep. 
com/article/20140623/NEWS02/306230016/wayne-county-tax-sale [https:// 
perma.cc/M3XP-4JFN]. 
38. Christine MacDonald, Wayne Co. Could Reclaim Nearly 20K Auctioned 
Properties Over Unpaid Bills, Detroit News (Aug. 16, 2014), http:// 
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2014/08/16/wayne- 
co-could-reclaim-nearly-20k-auctioned-properties-over-unpaid-bills/14146103/ 
[https://perma.cc/S57M-3D37]. 
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County’s overall procedure is fairly representative of procedures in oth-
er states and localities.39 The period from tax nonpayment to foreclosure 
and auction sale is, at its fastest, three years. In Wayne County, a 
homeowner pays property taxes each December and each July. Home-
owners may pay the local municipal treasurer any tax balance by 
February. If the homeowner misses this deadline, on March 140 the taxes 
become delinquent and the balance is sent to the county treasurer for 
collection.41 At this point, the county treasurer adds in penalties at four 
percent per month and interest at one percent per month.42 The trea-
surer may provide taxpayer assistance for taxpayers with certain exten-
uating circumstances.43 Based on the shortened tax foreclosure timeline 
implemented by Michigan state legislators in 1999, if the taxpayer does 
not pay the balance, penalties, and interest by March of the next year, 
the property will forfeit to the county treasurer, which brings along 
additional fees and higher interest.44 By November of that year, the list 
of forfeited properties will be published, and by March of the year foll-
 
39. For a helpful overview of tax foreclosure procedures in various states, see 
Daniel J. Hammel & Sujata Shetty, Complexity and Change in the Foreclosure 
Process in Toledo, 23 Housing Pol’y Debate 35, 39–40 (2013). 
40. Real Property Tax Foreclosure Timeline, Michigan.gov, http://michigan. 
gov/documents/taxes/ForfeitureForeclosureTimelinesChart_317028_7.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TKH4-UFEK]; Real Property Tax Forfeiture and Foreclosure 
Flow Chart, Michigan.gov, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/taxes/ 
FF-FC-TimelineFlowChart_Printable._317032_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
97LA-335H]. 
41. Compassionate Leader: A Talk with Wayne County Treasurer Raymond 
Wojtowicz, Mich. Chron. (March 14, 2012) http://michronicleonline.com/ 
2012/03/14/compassionate-leader [https://perma.cc/47ET-6F7Q] [hereinafter 
A Talk with Wayne County Treasurer]; Delinquent Property Taxes-Foreclosure 
Timeline, Wayne County Treasurer, http://www.waynecounty.com/ 
treasurer/783.htm [https://perma.cc/UP9E-9WRN]; Mich. Comp. Laws 
Ann. § 211.78 (West Supp. 2016). After serving as Wayne County Treasurer 
for thirty-nine years, Raymond Wojtowicz retired in late 2015. Initially replaced 
by Richard Hathaway, Eric Sabree now serves as Wayne County Treasurer. 
Marti Bendetti, ‘Time to Pass the Torch,’ Says Wayne County Treasurer 
Raymond Wojtowicz After 39 Years on Job, Crain’s Detroit Bus. (Oct. 
4, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20151004/NEWS/ 
310049995/time-to-pass-the-torch-says-retiring-wayne-county-treasurer 
[https://perma.cc/9ZHA-2QTL]; Robert Snell, Wayne County Treasurer 
Hathaway Abruptly Quits Post, Crain’s Detroit Bus. (March 4, 2016, 
4:18 PM), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20160304/NEWS/160309913/ 
wayne-county-treasurer-hathaway-abruptly-quits-post [https://perma.cc/ 
VEC6-CY7K]. 
42. A Talk with Wayne County Treasurer, supra note 41. 
43. Id. 
44. Id.; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 211.78. 
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owing the forfeiture, a Wayne County Circuit Court will enter a judg-
ment of foreclosure against those properties.45 Delinquent property own-
ers have one final opportunity to redeem properties by paying the bal-
ance due by March 30. If the homeowner has not paid, on April 1 the 
property is foreclosed, the county treasurer takes title to the property, 
and the homeowner no longer retains any rights to the property unless 
he or she works with the treasurer to enter into a taxpayer assistance 
program.46 The foreclosed properties are then put up for public auction 
each fall.47 In 2014, Wayne County began foreclosure proceedings on 
76,000 properties, 62,000 of which are located within the City of 
Detroit.48 Approximately 20,000 of those Detroit properties are current-
ly owner occupied.49 
Wayne County does not always follow its foreclosure process on 
tax-delinquent properties, as evidenced by Wayne County’s decision 
not to pursue foreclosures on approximately 40,000 Detroit properties 
in 2012 and 36,000 in 2013 because of the extremely high volume of 
properties.50 According to the Detroit News, the treasurer has opted 
against foreclosure on properties with low tax balances since at least 
2005, setting $1,700 as the limit in 2012 and $1,600 in 2013.51 In 2015, 
Wayne County’s treasurer extended payment deadlines multiple times 
to attempt to keep as many homeowners in their homes as possible.52 
The Detroit News found that some area speculators had been taking 
advantage of this unwritten policy, which “means that taxes are essen-
tially optional on nearly one in ten city parcels.”53 These uncertainties 
may also deter potential developers from working in the Detroit area, 
 
45. A Talk with Wayne County Treasurer, supra note 41. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Laitner, supra note 31. 
49. Chad Livengood, Detroit Scores Tax Foreclosure Victories, Detroit News 
(Dec. 18, 2014, 8:32 PM) http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/ 
2014/12/18/detroit-tax-foreclosure/20617761/ [https://perma.cc/6XMU-EJRY]. 
50. Christine MacDonald, Overwhelmed Wayne County Ignores Thousands of 
Possible Detroit Foreclosures, Detroit News (Feb. 21, 2013, 1:00 AM) 
http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20130221/METRO01/302210394 
[https://perma.cc/C3X9-7C46]. 
51. Id. 
52. Christine MacDonald, Christine Ferretti & Joel Kurth, Wayne County Extends 
Foreclosure Deadline to May 12, Detroit News (Mar. 31, 2015, 12:49 PM) 
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2015/03/31/ 
wayne-county-property-tax-deadline/70722084/ [https://perma.cc/2ZM8- 
Z5ME]. 
53. MacDonald, supra note 50.  
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as parcels of interest may remain tied up in delinquency or in the fore-
closure process for some time.54 
C. Foreclosure Prevention Initiatives 
In 2014, Michigan lawmakers passed statewide initiatives to reduce 
tax delinquency and foreclosure and to prevent Wayne County owner-
occupants from losing their homes.55 Under the new plan, the County 
reduced interest rates for owner-occupants,56 in some cases capping tax 
bills at one-quarter of the market value of the home to keep the tax  
bill at a reasonably repayable level.57 As a second effort to prevent 
homeowner-occupants from losing their homes, Michigan lawmakers ap-
proved HB 4882 in late 2014 to allow county treasurers to waive interest 
entirely for homeowners at or below federal poverty levels if a home-
owner pays off all back taxes through an installment plan.58 Detroit 
Mayor Mike Duggan called the payment plans a “once-in-a-lifetime 
break” for Detroit owner-occupants.59 
 
54. Brian Gormley, Appraising Detroit: A Follow-Up to HUD’s “Barriers to the 
Rehabilitation of Affordable Housing Study”, 12 J. Affordable Housing 
& Community Dev. L. 314, 318 (2003). 
55. Laitner, supra note 31. 
56. Where once the treasurer would charge all homeowners delinquent for greater 
than one year an eighteen percent interest rate, a twelve percent annual rate 
will apply instead. The eighteen percent interest rate made repayment virtually 
impossible for some homeowners. Lawmakers explained that the eighteen 
percent tax rate was set before the legislature even imagined the foreclosure 
crisis the state would face, and so lawmakers did not foresee the high number 
of owner-occupants who would be harmed by the higher rates. Id.  
57. Christine MacDonald, Snyder Signs Bill Closing Tax Foreclosure Loophole, 
Detroit News (Jan. 14, 2015, 6:10 PM) http://www.detroitnews.com/story/ 
news/local/michigan/2015/01/14/snyder-bills-close-foreclosure-loophole/ 
21768471/ [https://perma.cc/82RP-PJ24]. 
58. Because interest and penalties can cause tax bills to double and triple overtime, 
this new legislative effort will help extremely distressed taxpayers create a 
plan to keep their homes and repay their tax debt. See id.; see also Sarah 
Cwiek, Detroit, Wayne County Could Get Foreclosure Help Out of “Lame 
Duck”, Mich. Radio (Dec. 5, 2014) http://michiganradio.org/post/detroit-
wayne-county-could-get-foreclosure-help-out-lame-duck [https://perma.cc/ 
UB6T-D5N7]. Low-income homebuyers are also more likely to purchase 
homes without knowing about existing tax debts on the property, as those 
purchasers may not have the financial capacity to hire a lawyer or complete 
a title search. Laitner, supra note 31. 
59. Dave LewAllen, March 31 Deadline Nears for Detroit Foreclosure Prevention 
Effort, WXYZ Detroit, (Mar. 13, 2015, 5:52 PM) http://www.wxyz.com/ 
news/region/detroit/march-31-deadline-nears-for-detroit-foreclosure-prevention- 
effort [https://perma.cc/BW8M-B363]. 
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D. Wayne County’s Tax Foreclosure Sale 
Since 2011, Wayne County has used a multistep online auction to 
sell its foreclosed properties.60 The process begins with an auction of 
every property foreclosed that year, with bidding starting at the value 
of the back taxes on the property.61 The properties that do not sell in 
the first round of bidding go on to a second round, where the minimum 
bid on most residential properties is only $500.62 Generally, the bulk of 
the auctions’ sales happen in this second round.63 Before Wayne County 
implemented its presale affidavit program,64 a homeowner who had lost 
a home to tax foreclosure could buy the property back during the tax 
foreclosure auction. This loophole helped a number of homeowners re-
claim properties for just a small portion of the original tax bill,65 a 
benefit to a struggling homeowner, but a huge revenue loss for Wayne 
County local governments and their services. 
While the move online has made the sale process significantly less 
arduous, the Wayne County annual auction, “one of the largest land 
sales in the world,”66 makes Wayne County’s properties available to 
everyone—even those who have never even visited the area. Because of 
this, out-of-state and out-of-country buyers may purchase a number of 
properties, then flip them onto other auction sites, like eBay.67 Chief 
 
60. Muller, supra note 33. 
61. Alex Alsup, Detroit Foreclosure Auction: All the Basics You Need to Know 
Before You Bid on Property, Huffington Post (Aug. 9, 2013, 8:32 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/09/detroit-foreclosure-auction-
wayne-county-properties_n_3726834.html [https://perma.cc/9NNN-T56S]. 
62. Id. 
63. In 2013, only about 800 properties sold during the first round, while the 
treasurer anticipated at least 8,000 properties to go during the $500-dollar 
minimum round. Muller, supra note 33. 
64. Infra Part III.B. 
65. Sarah Cwiek, Wayne County Sues to Collect Back Taxes on Properties it 
Once Sold at Tax Foreclosure Auctions, Mich. Radio (June 19, 2014), http:// 
michiganradio.org/post/wayne-county-sues-collect-back-taxes-properties-
it-once-sold-tax-foreclosure-auctions [https://perma.cc/YJ4K-7F8W] (explaining 
that this simple way for property owners to wipe clean a large amount of debt 
from their tax bills was a problematic hurdle in Wayne County’s attempts 
to replace problematic property owners with tax-abiding owners who will 
maintain the properties). 
66. Muller, supra note 33. 
67. Amy Swift, Some Sold Tax Auction Properties Already Listed on Ebay, 
Detroit Curbed (Oct. 31, 2012) http://detroit.curbed.com/archives/2012/ 
10/going-through-auction-withdrawal-check-out-ebay-for-sold-properties.php 
[https://perma.cc/59JF-F2Y3]. This practice is not unique to Wayne County 
or to online auctions. Even Cuyahoga County, which holds its tax auctions 
in person in Downtown Cleveland, and Hamilton County, which holds its 
auctions at the Hamilton County Court House in Cincinnati struggle with 
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Deputy Treasurer David Szymanski explained that the County has had 
bulk buyers take advantage of the low pricing to buy a large number 
of properties and then sort through them later. The bulk buyers would 
then decide to “neglect[] both physically and financially” those prop-
erties the bulk buyers did not find valuable enough to want to keep.68 
Because of the high volume of properties selling at auction each Octo-
ber, about 20,000 each in 201369 and 2014,70 buyers may bid on proper-
ties with very little information on their condition.71 Wayne County has 
attempted to shield the very worst properties from ending up in the 
hands of unknowing investors by organizing the problem lots into large 
bulk groupings during the foreclosure auction.72 The idea of such an 
arrangement is that the bidders who could afford to obtain a bulk 
grouping of problem lots would be experienced investors with very high 
available capital, and those investors would more likely know better 
than to take on properties they cannot handle.73 Still, given the relative-
ly low sale prices for some of Wayne County’s most troubling proper-
ties, even these bulk lots cannot guarantee that irresponsible or ill-
willed investors will not step in.  
out-of-state investors. Frank Ford, Fed. Reserve Bd., Reo and Vacant 
Properties: Strategies for Neighborhood Stabilization, 141–42 
(2010); Foreclosure Sales, Cuyahoga Cnty. Sherriff, http://sheriff. 
cuyahogacounty.us/en-us/foreclosure-sales.aspx [https://perma.cc/E3SG- 
3NJD] (last visited May 5, 2016); Hagit Limor, Fox19 Investigates: Are 
Demolished Cincy Homes Being Sold Online?, Fox19 (Feb. 21, 2014), 
http://apmobile.worldnow.com/story/24777377/fox19-investigatesare-
demolished-cincy-homes-being-sold-online [https://perma.cc/DV4Q-X4D8]; 
Weekly Property Sales Search Page Disclaimer, Hamilton Cty. Sheriff’s 
Office http://apps.hcso.org/Property.aspx [https://perma.cc/P8ZJ-NQTD] 
(last visited May 5, 2016); John Kroll, eBay Auctions Become House Flippers’ 
Tools, The Plain Dealer (Sept. 5, 2008, 10:20 PM), http://blog.cleveland. 
com/metro/2008/09/ebay_auctions_become_house_fli.html [https:// 
perma.cc/VQ9A-RKWQ]. 
68. Muller, supra note 33. 
69. Wayne County Auction Offers Nearly 20,000 Properties for Sale, 
Detroit 20/20 ABC 7 (Sept. 10, 2013) http://detroit2020.com/2013/09/ 
10/wayne-county-auction-offers-nearly-20000-properties-for-sale/ [https:// 
perma.cc/HSY3-5ZH4] [hereinafter 20,000 Properties for Sale]. 
70. Karen Weise, A Mystery Bidder Offers $3 Million for 6,000 of Detroit’s 
Worst Homes, BusinessWeek (Oct. 24, 2014) http://www.businessweek.com/ 
articles/2014-10-24/buying-derelict-detroit-mystery-bidder-wants-6-000-
foreclosed-homes [https://perma.cc/98H3-3LQW]. 
71. 20,000 Properties for Sale, supra note 69. 
72. Gary Anglebrandt, Wayne County Sees Bigger as Better in Foreclosure 
Auction, Crain’s Detroit Bus. (Aug. 17, 2013, 8:25 AM) http://www. 
crainsdetroit.com/article/20130804/NEWS/130819879/wayne-county-sees- 
bigger-as-better-in-foreclosure-auction [https://perma.cc/Q9DS-CHC5]. 
73. Id. 
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E. Land Bank Disposition 
If no buyers bid on properties after the second round of bidding in 
the tax foreclosure auction, the treasurer will first offer the properties 
to the city in which they are located. If the city does not want the 
properties, the treasurer will direct the properties to one of Wayne 
County’s local land banks.74 From there, properties can be directed to 
a variety of new, productive uses without any hindering tax liens.75 
Properties reclaimed through the reverter proceeding will also transfer 
to either the Wayne County or Detroit land banks, though the land 
banks have not yet announced the projects planned for the 20,000 prop-
erties.76 
II. Encouraging Responsible Auction Buyers and 
Reducing Post-Sale Delinquency 
The State of Michigan and Wayne County have implemented two 
distinct programs meant to address problem auction buyers. In theory, 
both show great promise in addressing problematic auction buyers, but 
only one of these potential solutions appears to be widely transferrable 
the other tax-collecting governments facing similar tax foreclosure 
auction issues. Wayne County’s first and most innovative effort, retain-
ing a possibility of reverter in each of the properties it sells at auction, 
is a near perfect solution in theory, but falls short in practice due to 
Wayne County’s huge volume of properties and the potential legal iss-
ues created by delays in the process. If a tax-collecting government is 
to implement such a post-sale approach to preventing blight and tax 
delinquency, it must only do so if it has a clear deed to create the future 
interest, a clear communications plan in place related to the reverter, 
and the resources to act quickly and decisively when the triggering con-
dition occurs. The reverter option is also likely of greatest benefit when 
dealing with small numbers of investors and business buyers, rather 
than new homeowner-occupants. To address issues with owner-occu-
pants, local governments should follow Michigan’s lead on its second 
delinquency-combatting effort: presale affidavits that will at least weed 
out those buyers who have a history of nonpayment or problematic 
property maintenance. 
 
74. Muller, supra note 33. 
75. Weise, supra note 70. 
76. Walker, supra note 37; infra Part III.A. 
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III. Solution One: Target Blight and Delinquency 
with Post-Sale Reverter 
Wayne County’s approach to tax foreclosure auctions stands out 
from its peers because of the reverter clause the County has added into 
the sales deeds for the tax foreclosure auctions since 2011.77 Possibility 
of reverter, the future interest associated with the possessory estate of 
fee simple determinable, is a long-standing component of property com-
mon law.78 While Wayne County’s use of reverter in its auction was a 
novel plan with a potential for success, its slow implementation in 
practice79 illustrated why this plan should not be used by other tax-
collecting governments unless those governments are able to act quickly 
and decisively on a limited number of problem properties. 
A. Wayne County’s Approach to the Reverter Clause 
Wayne County’s reverter clause, explained to buyers before the 
auction in the Bidding Rules,80 specifies that the treasurer will convey 
properties won in the auction through quit claim deeds with conditions 
subsequent requiring the purchaser to: (1) pay all taxes for the year of 
purchase and the following two years; (2) either maintain the property 
for two years or demolish the structure within six months; (3) comply 
with the conditions or remedy failure to comply within thirty days of 
written notice; and (4) keep and not sell, transfer, or convey the prop-
erty subject to the reverter clause until the required payment term  
has ended.81 The conditions address each of the main problems Wayne 
County faces after its auctions: tax delinquency, property disrepair, and 
quick property flipping.82 
The treasurer or other local government agent will provide the 
homeowner with written notice of the default of either tax payments or 
property maintenance, delivered to the address written on the deed, 
unless the homeowner has filed paperwork with the treasurer noting 
 
77. Muller, supra note 33. 
78. Infra Part III.A. 
79. See Bill Laitner, Wayne Co. Residents Get 5 More Months to Pay Tax 
Debts, Detroit Free Press (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.freep.com/story/ 
news/local/michigan/wayne/2014/11/26/tax-foreclosure-wayne-county-
detroit-craig-fahle-rashida-tlaib/70118822 [https://perma.cc/U8SY-6A4S] 
(granting taxpayers an extension to pay back taxes). 
80. Office of the Wayne County Treasurer, Terms and Conditions 
of Sale October 1–October 28, 2014, Tax Foreclosed Property 
Auction 10, http://voiceofdetroit.net/wp-content/uploads/Wayne-County- 
Treasurer-Bidding_Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GLJ-6WA8]. 
81. Id. 
82. See supra Part I.D. 
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some other address.83 If a property owner served with such notice pays 
the balance due or demolishes the requisite property, the County will 
no longer pursue the reverter. Instead of paying the balance in a lump 
sum, the homeowner may choose to take advantage of the court hearing 
to which each homeowner is entitled to contest the tax due, or the 
homeowner may take on a new four- or ten-month payment plan to 
bring the tax bill current.84 If the homeowner does not cooperate with 
the available options within thirty days, the condition of the reverter 
has therefore been met, and title to the property will revert back to 
Wayne County.85 
For years, neither the city governments nor Wayne County took 
advantage of this option to combat tax delinquency and property mis-
management following the foreclosure sale.86 In 2014, however, faced 
with a seventy-eight percent delinquency rate on all properties sold at 
auction since 2011, the Wayne County treasurer decided to sue to en-
force the clause on all 20,000 tax-delinquent auction sales. Those prop-
erties together represented approximately $80 million in lost revenue 
for the County.87 As explained further in Part V, not all citizens were 
pleased with the County’s choice to use the reverter clause to deal with 
the massive number of auction properties that returned to delinquency 
post sale. Many critics suggested the government intervention should 
have come earlier to prevent irresponsible foreclosure-auction buying.88 
Other Wayne County property owners were simply happy to see some 
consequence for irresponsible investors who harm property values in 
areas where they purchase properties quickly but never repair them.89 
Even after the hearing and the court’s approval of the property’s 
reversion to Wayne County, Wayne County has not taken possession 
of any of the reverter properties, and homeowners have had a number 
of opportunities to redeem their properties.90 As deadlines have come 
and passed, the treasurer has extended dates and offered more time for 
 
83. Office of the Wayne County Treasurer, supra note 80. 
84. Cwiek, supra note 65.  
85. Id. 
86. One study hypothesized, before the treasurer attempted to enforce the reverter, 
that “the Treasurer and city officials likely lack the capacity to enforce this 
policy.” Dewar, Seymour & Druta, supra note 1, at 606. 
87. Cwiek, supra note 65.  
88. Id. 
89. See Muller, supra note 33 (talking to one such property owner). 
90. As of July 2015, there had been no news of how or when Wayne County 
planned to address the reverter properties. 
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struggling homeowners.91 The Wayne County Third Circuit court hear-
ing was held on August 15, 2014. After the judge approved the reverter, 
owners could still opt to reclaim the property through mid-December 
2014 simply by paying the delinquent bill. The County had planned to 
take back all properties that had not been paid off by January 2015 
and transfer those properties to the Wayne County Land Bank or the 
Detroit Land Bank. In late November 2014, however, the treasurer ex-
tended repayment deadlines for an additional five months, meaning 
struggling homeowners could take until May 26, 2015 to repay back 
taxes before Wayne County would step in and reclaim its property 
interest.92 Even if the treasurer had decided not to give any extensions 
and transfer the properties directly to the land bank, the transaction 
would remain open-ended, as the land bank gives homeowners the opp-
ortunity to pay their delinquent tax bills along with a $500 processing 
fee to take the properties back.93 
B. Future Interests as Helpful Governmental Tools 
When used efficiently and fairly, a fee simple determinable with a 
government entity holding the possibility of reverter seems to be a 
sound means to maintain some control over the future of the parcel. A 
possibility of reverter is one type of future interest in a property, mean-
ing the original grantor retains some right to the property, based on 
the conditions agreed upon by the parties.94 The Anglo-American prop-
erty regime has always given the option for full property owners to 
grant only some of the rights to the property, rather than granting the 
entire bundle of rights in the property.95 The grantor may give those 
other retained rights to another party, or the grantor may keep them 
for him or herself.96 The grantee, here the bidder in the foreclosure 
auction, receives a fee simple determinable. This means the bidder has 
full ownership of the property, limited by the conditions triggering the 
reverter. The grantor, in this case the treasurer, retains future interest 
in the property, which automatically vests upon the occurrence of the 
 
91. Laitner, supra note 79; David Muller, Wayne County Treasurer Extends Tax 
Deadline for Homes Bought Off Auctions, MLive (Nov. 26, 2014, 8:37 PM), 
http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2014/11/wayne_county 
_treasurer_extends.html [https://perma.cc/QF3G-477D]. 
92. Laitner, supra note 79; Muller, supra note 91. However, the treasurer’s office 
has not made any subsequent announcements regarding the recollection or 
treatment of these properties. 
93. MacDonald, supra note 38. 
94. See Frona Powell, Defeasible Fees and the Nature of Real Property, 40 U. 
Kan. L. Rev. 411, 411–12 (1992) (explaining reverters). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 4·2016 
Interrupting the Blight Cycle 
1100 
conditions of the reverter.97 Once the condition has occurred and the 
property reverts back to the grantor, the grantor then holds the proper-
ty in fee simple absolute.98 
Possibilities of reverter serve as a fairly common strategy among 
land banks.99 Generally, land banks require prospective owners to pro- 
vide detailed plans before purchase to ensure the properties will be put 
to an approved use and will be brought up to code, and reverters give 
land banks a means to hold purchasers accountable for making the 
required repairs and improvements.100 Land bank reverter clauses are 
usually focused on the condition of the property, as compared to Wayne 
County’s interest in full tax payment over two years. While reverters 
offer a means to control future behavior related to the property, rever-
sionary interests are not always favored when trying to spur develop-
ment through new land use because of the severe potential results if the 
purchasing party violates the agreement and because of the wariness of 
banks to finance projects on property with such possible reverters.101 
Other fee simple defeasibles exist to allow property owners to con-
trol future land use and subsequent disposition, but fee simple deter-
 
97. See Danaya C. Wright, Eminent Domain, Exactions, and Railbanking: Can 
Recreational Trails Survive the Court’s Fifth Amendment Takings Juris-
prudence?, 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 399, 441 (2001) (explaining reverters). 
98. See Darren A. Prum & Robert J. Aalberts, Our Own Private Sustainable 
Community: Are Green Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions a Viable 
Alternative to a More Environmentally Sustainable Future for Homeowners?, 
43 N.M. L. Rev. 157, 161 (2013) (illustrating a fee simple determinable). 
99. Frank S. Alexander, Ctr. for Cmty. Progress, Land Banks and 
Land Banking 74 (2d ed. 2015) (noting that this approach is problematic 
in a number of ways, and listing alternative approaches). The City of Detroit 
and its land bank have also used reverter rights to encourage responsible 
renovation when auctioning city-owned homes. The City could reclaim 
auction-purchased homes if the buyers did not obtain a certificate of occupancy 
and an actual occupant within six months of purchase. Christine Ferretti, 
Detroit Home Auction Program Falters, Detroit News (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2015/01/22/ 
detroit-home-auction/22202417/ [https://perma.cc/ZNN3-HVH4]. 
100. Gunton, supra note 6, at 552, 562–63 (2007) (including St. Louis, Cleveland 
and Atlanta Land Banks); see U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., NSP 
Land Banking Toolkit: Overview of Land Bank Decisions and 
Tools 12, https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/LandBank 
Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/D636-G6QV] (“Even with careful due 
diligence, the land bank should still be mindful of these risks, and should make 
sure that to the extent possible, properties are conveyed with strict terms to 
ensure that they are in fact re-used properly, and with provisions that allow 
the land bank to recapture the property (reverter or reversionary rights) if 
the terms are not complied with.”) 
101. Gunton, supra note 6, at 563–65. 
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minable and possibility of reverter seem best suited for the tax fore-
closure sale scenario. The grantor’s other option would be the fee simple 
subject to a condition subsequent and its complementary future inter-
est, the right of reentry.102 Possibilities of reverter differ from rights of 
reentry because possibilities of reverter vest to the grantor immediately 
after the condition happens, while rights of reentry merely offer the 
grantor the option to choose to take the property back.103 
Potentially problematically, the distinction between these two 
future interests has blurred in many courts,104 and it can be difficult to 
predict whether a court will find a possibility of reverter or a right of 
reentry based on the conveyance language.105 Fee simple determinable 
and fee simple subject to a condition subsequent are both often used to 
restrict the use of property106—the main difference is that a grantor 
does not need to do anything to trigger repossession once the condition 
occurs when using a fee simple determinable or a possibility of revert-
er.107 A tax-collecting government planning to recollect properties with-
out the court’s help may prefer reverters for this reason. Practically, 
however, even though a possibility of reverter vests at the moment the 
condition occurs,108 a grantor will still likely need the assistance of the 
courts to establish that the condition did occur and to finalize the re-
turn.109 A local government may even elect to use a fee simple subject 
to a condition subsequent instead of the fee simple determinable if it 
expects procedural delays like those experienced by Wayne County. In 
those situations, it could prioritize recollection and only pursue the 
properties it wants back,110 rather than face the return of thousands of 
properties to its inventory at once.  
102. Powell, supra note 94, at 412–13. 
103. 3 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 20.03 (Michael 
Allan Wolf ed., 2015). 
104. Id. 
105. E.g., Allison Dunham, Possibility of Reverter and Powers of Termination—
Fraternal or Identical Twins?, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 215, 215 (1953). 
106. Prum & Aalberts, supra note 98, at 160. See also Dunham, supra note 105, 
at 218–19 (noting another difference between the immediately vesting 
possibility of reverter and the delayed right of reentry is the possibility 
for damages for waste: because of the reverter’s immediate vestment, the 
grantor may be able to collect waste damages from the grantee for the time 
between the commission of the limiting act and the actual transfer or property 
which would be unavailable in the reentry situation). 
107. Powell, supra note 94, at 412. 
108. Id. 
109. Jonathan L. Entin, Defeasible Fees, State Action, and the Legacy of Massive 
Resistance, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 769, 772 (1993). 
110. This would actually be a similar approach to Wayne County’s current tax 
foreclosure activities, where certain properties with only small values in 
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C. Homeowners’ Potential Challenges: Agreement  
Construction and Equity 
Reverter is a long-standing property interest, and, as such, it would 
not infringe on the purchasers’ rights through its normal use—the pur-
chaser only owns a fee simple determinable, so that property interest 
ends as soon as the limiting condition occurs.111 The Wayne County 
Third Circuit Court agreed that the clause in Wayne County’s tax 
auction deeds should be enforced and the treasurer should reclaim the 
delinquent properties. Due to the varying ways a court may interpret 
the condition or limitation in conveyance language, other tax-collecting 
governments may need to plan for the possibility the court may not opt 
to approve the properties’ forfeiture back to the government. The court 
may find the deed restrictions to be real covenants or another type of 
agreement not subject to automatic vestment of the property to the 
grantor, based either on the deed agreement construction or on princip-
les of equity.112 
Like defeasible fees, real covenants are products of early common 
law. They differ from defeasible fees because rather than placing limit-
ations on ownership rights, real covenants place contractual restrictions 
on property use.113 These restrictions are tied to the property itself, 
continuing on even when the property is sold or transferred.114 If the 
grantor has not included a forfeiture provision in the deed, the court is 
more likely to find a restrictive covenant instead of a possibility of re-
verter. This means the court may enforce the terms of the covenant, 
but the grantee may not lose the property because it has violated the 
covenant.115 A court may prefer this option to the singular, harsh result 
under a defeasible fee: covenants give the court greater latitude to act 
equitably, and to consider social policy in creating the best possible 
resolution to the property disagreement.116 The auction buyer would 
prefer the real covenant application, as a damages judgment would be 
less immediately problematic than an instant transfer of the property. 
However, tax-collecting governments would likely almost always prefer 
the defeasible fees to a covenant so as to maintain greater control and 
 
delinquency or with some development purpose remain in the original owner’s 
possession, even though the County could opt to foreclose. Supra Part I.D. 
111. Supra Part III.A. 
112. Powell, supra note 94, at 425–26. 
113. Prum & Aalberts, supra note 98, at 165–68. 
114. Id. 
115. See Kevin A. Bowman, The Short Term Versus the Dead Hand: Litigating 
Our Dedicated Public Parks, 65 U. Cin. L. Rev. 595, 604–07 (1997) (collecting 
cases). 
116. Powell, supra note 94, at 425–26. 
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to avoid only earning damages from homeowners who would not have 
the money to pay.117 
In some states, the court may even apply equitable principles to 
defeasible fees, limiting enforcement or even canceling the future inter-
est altogether.118 Existing research suggests equity generally may over-
power written reverters when those provisions are affected by “change 
of conditions” or “passage of ‘reasonable time.’”119 When dealing with 
property and tax maintenance post-auction, as long as the tax-collect-
ing government uses a provision covering only a short period of time, 
such as Wayne County’s two-year payment requirement, the provision 
should remain reasonable120 and should not be limited by equity. Tax-
collecting governments should be aware of possible “change[s] of condi-
tion” during any planned reverter periods, such as the severe housing 
market troubles in Detroit.121 
Often in attempts to limit defeasible fee enforcement, the roles are 
reversed: governments often receive donated land for specific uses, such 
as a park or a school, and they may attempt to challenge reverter rights 
on those properties when they hope to use the land for some other 
purpose.122 In the case of the tax foreclosure sale, the roles are reversed, 
but the arguments remain applicable. Defeasible fees give grantors sig-
nificant power over the buyer’s land use, so courts tend to prefer to 
construe conveyances in ways that will limit that power to the extent 
that it would cause grantee forfeiture.123 The possible construction chall-
enge is not enough to rule out the reverter as a potential solution for 
 
117. Id. at 413. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 426. 
120. Id. at 428–29. 
121. While the housing market in Detroit was struggling before this plan was 
implemented in Wayne County, Detroit continued to lag to such an extent 
that many were pushing for a full tax-foreclosure moratorium in the city. 
See Rebecca Kruth, Groups Press for Tax Foreclosure Moratorium as 
Wayne Co. Extend Deadline, Mich. Radio (May 12, 2015), http://michigan 
radio.org/post/groups-press-tax-foreclosure-moratorium-wayne-co-extend- 
deadline#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/FSX6-E2LY]. Such a significant strain 
on the entire city’s ability to keep up with taxes on properties appraised for 
much higher values than the values for which such a property could currently 
sell, could be enough to argue a change of condition. 
122. See Entin, supra note 109 at 781–82 (explaining case where conveyance of 
land for white-only park); Bowman, supra note 115, at 596 (explaining case 
where state sought to sell land to Walmart, while land was conveyed for public 
use). 
123. See generally Powell, supra note 94. (explaining grantor’s power over defeasible 
fees). 
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tax foreclosure auctions, particularly since Wayne County’s Third Cir-
cuit upheld the reverter on more than 20,000 properties last year. This 
preference for nonforfeiture simply means any tax-collecting govern-
ment attempting to use this plan for its foreclosure sales must be certain 
to use well-drafted language in its sales agreements that does not give 
the government more power over grantee than necessary.124 
D. Delays in Taking Possession 
As Wayne County’s example has shown, even though reverters 
transfer immediately on the occurrence of the triggering condition, 
significant delays to the process are possible.125 Most communities will 
not likely face the extremely high numbers of problem properties that 
Wayne County did, but a less burdened community may still deal with 
some difficult-to-reach buyers or bureaucratic hold-ups when trying to 
enforce its possibilities of reverter. These issues could leave a property 
outside of the tax-collecting government’s possession long after the 
triggering condition transfers ownership, just as they did for Wayne 
County’s 20,000 possibilities of reverter. In those situations, the tax-
collecting government must be prepared to address the potential issues 
created by allowing the original owners’ continued use of properties that 
have technically already transferred back to the tax-collecting govern-
ment. Depending on the applicable adverse possession or squatters’ 
rights laws in the state containing the auction properties,126 and there-
fore depending on the length of time during which the government fails 
 
124. While this Note does not emphasize the drafting aspect of the possibility of 
reverter, the clearly drafted conveyance will likely need to include the tradi-
tional words of limitation to create a defeasible fee, such as “while,” “during,” 
or “so long as,” which would suggest the property right being granted is less 
than a full fee simple absolute. However, these words of limitation are not 
necessarily a mandatory component of the conveyance. See Powell, supra 
note 94, at 414–15. 
125. In this example, tax nonpayment not corrected within thirty days would 
trigger the reverter and would transfer ownership from the purchaser back 
to Wayne County. However, even after the treasurer went to court to enforce 
the County’s interests, the treasurer continued to offer grace periods that 
allowed the purchaser or purchaser’s tenants to remain on the property that 
had technically already reverted back. Laitner, supra note 79. 
126. In Michigan, the statutory period for all claims of title under a deed or other 
court-ordered sale is five years, and the period for all other cases not involving 
a deed or court-ordered sale, a tax deed, or a will is fifteen years. Mich. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5801 (West 2013). In Michigan, a claim for adverse 
possession requires possession to have been open, notorious, exclusive, 
continuous, and uninterrupted for statutory period, hostile, and under cover 
of claim of right. See, e.g., Beach v. Twp. of Lima, 802 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Mich. 
2011) (explaining a family farm’s use of undeveloped land previously purchased 
by the township did establish a claim of adverse possession). Auction buyers 
who remain in the reverted homes are openly, notoriously, exclusively, and 
continuously occupying the property. The occupant’s claim my fail, however, 
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to take possession of the reverted property, a government may face 
future challenges to quiet title once the government opts to step in.127 
IV. Solution Two: Presale Affidavit: Keeping  
Problem Buyers Out 
At the same time the Michigan legislature was debating new debt 
relief provisions for struggling taxpayers, it was also considering means 
to limit who may purchase new properties in annual tax foreclosure 
auctions. In January 2015, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder signed S.B. 
0295, which requires auction participants to sign an affidavit before 
bidding stating the bidder: (1) does not owe fines for tax collection 
violation; (2) has not or is not working for someone who has held prop-
erty that a government agency foreclosed upon within the past three 
years; and (3) did not own property that a government agency has filed 
foreclosure proceedings upon within the same taxable year.128 If the in-
dividual lies on the affidavit, that individual would be subject to perjury 
charges.129 
An additional bill has passed in the Michigan House and is awaiting 
Senate approval130 to give the County the option to cancel a sale if, 
after the auction ends, the County finds out the purchaser lied on the 
affidavit. In that case, the County could then offer the property to the 
next highest bidder, assuming that second bidder had been truthful in 
its affidavit.131 This plan would give the Michigan County treasurers 
additional power to preempt problem purchasers132 and reduce need for 
post-sale collection options. This amendment would immediately close 
 
in regards to hostility: The treasurer in Wayne County has so far given a 
number of additional redemption periods, so the government could argue this 
was simply permissive use. 
127. However, if these auction properties are located in an area with a history of 
squatter troubles, the municipality may also have laws to help the owner 
(in this case, the tax-collecting government) remove trespassers from the prop-
erty. See Khalil AlHajal, Detroit Looks to Alert Property Owners, Trespassers 
to New Anti-Squatting Laws, MLive (Oct. 13, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www. 
mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2014/10/detroit_looks_to_alert_propert.
html [https://perma.cc/EZ83-W327]. 
128. S.B. 295 (Mich. 2013); Senate Fiscal Agency, Sales of Tax Delinquent 
Property Analysis as Reported From Committee (2013). 
129. MacDonald, supra note 57. 
130. H.B. 5960 (Mich. 2014). 
131. Chad Livengood, Michigan House OKs Tax Foreclosure Bidder Ban, Detroit 
News (December 10, 2014, 11:13 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/ 
news/politics/michigan/2014/12/10/house-tax-foreclosure-bidder-ban/ 
20213961/ [https://perma.cc/98Z7-2YCH]. 
132. Id. 
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the loophole that has allowed tax-delinquent homeowners to wait out 
the first round of the tax auction and repurchase their own foreclosed 
properties for the $500 minimum bid in the second phase, thus clearing 
out all tax debt over the price paid in the auction.133 These loophole 
buyers made up 400 of the overall 2011 tax foreclosure auction purchas-
ers.134 
V. Practical Concerns and Policy Considerations 
As explained in Part III, a well drafted deed providing a fee simple 
determinable to the auction purchaser and possibility of reverter to the 
grantor government is a workable means to prevent neglect and delin-
quency post-sale. However, this type of plan may not be the optimal 
policy choice in terms of fairness in dealing with various types of buyers 
and in terms of efficiency in preventing future blight and tax delinquen-
cy. Before a state legislature or local tax-collecting government decides 
to pursue a reverter plan or a presale affidavit plan, it should consider 
the resources and staffing available for each type of initiative to address 
the following practical concerns. 
A. Treatment for Bulk Real Estate Investors v. Owner-Occupants 
Taxpayers have a variety of reasons for choosing whether to pay 
property taxes and whether to bring a home up to code,135 and that 
decision may hinge upon whether the individual is an investor with 
many properties meant to maximize profit, or an owner-occupant just 
trying to stay afloat.136 This is particularly true in legacy cities and 
other communities continuing to struggle in the wake of the foreclosure 
crisis.137 At the court hearing on Wayne County’s bulk reverter action, 
several homeowners argued that they should not have to give up their 
homes because they had no idea such a reverter policy existed.138 While 
 
133. Dewar, Seymour & Druta, supra note 1, at 20 (explaining that before this 
loophole was closed, it was a common plan for tax-delinquent owners, including 
investors holding large numbers of properties.). The loophole is closed under 
the current affidavit law, except where homeowners lie and get through the 
sale without detection. In those cases, if the County found out, the owner 
would still have the property and would just face perjury charges. See infra 
note 162. 
134. Cwiek, supra note 65. 
135. See supra notes 19–27 and accompanying text (explaining the difference 
between flippers, holders, milkers, and rehabbers). 
136. Id. 
137. Thriving Communities Report, supra note 13, at 6. 
138. MacDonald, supra note 38. 
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ignorance of law in real estate transactions is no excuse for tax delin-
quency,139 the homeowners’ confusion suggests that perhaps these pol-
icies are unfair to unsophisticated owner-occupant homebuyers who 
either do not have the means to or do not understand the importance 
of obtaining legal advice when purchasing property.140 Scholarship on 
traditional tax foreclosure has suggested different treatment for differ-
ent segments of the population, such as increased leniency for senior 
citizens,141 so it seems at least worth considering alternative options for 
disadvantaged homebuyers. 
In addition to knowledge disparity between investors and owner-
occupants, these auction buyers also differ in the potential loss created 
by losing a property. Losing an investment property in as quickly as 
thirty days through a reverter program may not be a life-changing event 
for a bulk-property investor, but a Detroit owner-occupant who receives 
the thirty-day notice of losing their recently purchased sole residence is 
in a much different situation.142 The deadline extensions Wayne County 
has provided in its reverter proceedings seemed to show some under-
standing for such situations,143 but without providing some other assist-
ance for payments, an extended deadline is unlikely to make the differ-
ence for a family struggling to pay its bills.144 State Representative from 
Detroit Rashida Tlaib commented on the need for greater assistance, 
and, soon after, the Michigan legislature passed its homeowner assist-
ance plan to reduce interest rates for tax-delinquent, low-income home-
owners.145 When Wayne County measures repayment rates on these 
reverted properties in May 2015, the measures of success will include 
 
139. See Alexander, supra note 17, at 779 (“Every owner of property knows or 
should know that real property is subject to taxation.”). 
140. MacDonald, supra note 50. 
141. See, e.g., Jennifer C.H. Francis, Redeeming What is Lost: The Need to 
Improve Notice for Elderly Homeowners Before and After Tax Sales, 25 
Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 85 (2014) (providing a legal basis and policy 
justifications for different tax foreclosure standards to meet the unusual needs 
of elderly homeowners and to make it easier for elderly homeowners to continue 
living in their homes). 
142. See, e.g., Prashant Gopal, Another Blight for Detroit: Property Taxes, 
BloombergBusiness (March 11, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2015-03-11/detroit-comeback-derailed-as-taxes-kill-
homeowner-dreams [https://perma.cc/4KW6-4A9V] (discussing the difficulties 
created for homeowners who lose homes through quick foreclosure processes). 
143. Laitner, supra note 79 (including a comment from the Wayne County treasurer 
that he does not want to have to take anyone’s home in these proceedings). 
144. Id. 
145. Dewar, Seymour & Druta, supra note 1, at 5. 
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effects from both the reverter program and the new interest rate reduc-
tion program.146 If the planned reverter program were to follow more 
closely its proposed timeline, unlike the Wayne County program,147 
these homeowner-occupants could lose properties before they even have 
a chance to find a replacement home. 
That does not mean that a more drawn out program would necess-
arily be better. In tax foreclosure proceedings, speed in putting proper-
ties to new uses is often given greater weight than considerations of the 
broad economic issues that cause homeowners to lose control of tax 
payments to begin with.148 However, speed in the process is not necess-
arily bad for the homeowner. Some researchers suggest delays in mort-
gage foreclosures create problematic uncertainty for homeowners, who 
might be better served by receiving clear deadlines and timelines for 
the process.149 This delicate balance applies equally to the proposed 
reverter program as it does to traditional foreclosure—the state legisla-
ture and tax-collecting government must decide together where to draw 
the line on how much help to provide the homeowner versus helping 
the local government obtain and repurpose the property.150 Some of the 
homeowners facing the 2014 reverter action suggested that not all  
the buyers should be subject to this accelerated property return.151 
Because investors make up a large proportion of the tax-foreclosure-sale 
buyers,152 including the reverter clauses only in deeds to non-owner-
occupants may give the flexibility needed to protect vulnerable low-
income buyers without limiting the tax-collecting government’s ability 
to act fast on problem bulk buyers. 
 
146. Because these programs have been implemented simultaneously, affecting 
some of the same homeowners, measuring success of one program independent 
of the other may be difficult. 
147. Muller, supra note 33.  
148. Dewar, Seymour & Druta, supra note 1, at 4. 
149. Charles Calomiris & Eric Higgins, Shadow Open Mkt. Comm., Are 
Delays to the Foreclosure Process a Good Thing? (March 25, 2011). 
150. MacDonald, supra note 38. 
151. Id. 
152. One author noted: 
More than 40% of properties [up for sale] with residential structures 
sold at the auctions between 2002 and 2009, but most of these went to 
investors. Few buyers purchased houses as owner-occupants, and few 
homeowners purchased adjacent lots for expanding a yard, although 
these were frequent types of purchases from the city’s inventory of 
properties. 
 Dewar, Seymour & Druta, supra note 1, at 14. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 4·2016 
Interrupting the Blight Cycle 
1109 
As was suggested during the 2014 Wayne County reverter enforce-
ment action,153 using a presale tactic to keep problem buyers from get-
ting involved in the auction in the first place may be a more equitable 
solution. The homeowners facing loss suggested instead that problem 
property owners—those owners known to buy in bulk and then collect 
rent and ignore the property without paying the requisite taxes—should 
not participate in future auctions.154 The homeowners suggested the 
county government should be more diligent in vetting buyers before the 
sale in order to prevent delinquency and blight post-auction and keep 
from needing strict consequences for non-payment after the sale.155 
Reducing the number of buyers could get Wayne County properties to 
the same result—the land banks—without the added reverter procedure 
in between. Particularly with fewer bulk buyers, questionable properties 
may be less likely to sell and more likely to pass straight through to the 
land banks.156 The State of Michigan has seemingly answered those 
homeowners’ requests in passing SB 0295, which created affidavits to 
hold bidders more responsible for their previous problems with tax fore-
closure and blight control.157 Of particular importance to fairness con-
siderations between owner-occupants and investment companies was 
the legislature’s differentiation between the two when setting time lim-
its since prior foreclosures: Owner-occupants must only wait one year 
following a tax foreclosure, while those who work for an investment 
company must wait three years after any tax foreclosures on that organ-
ization’s properties.158 
Success of affidavit programs implemented elsewhere will likely de-
pend on how successfully the program encourages truthfulness and 
creates means to punish purchases made by unidentified problem buy-
ers. While the only current remedy in Wayne County if a bidder lies 
about prior involvement in these problems is perjury, additional legisla-
tion currently awaiting approval could strengthen the County’s ability 
 
153. MacDonald, supra note 38. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Many of these homes would not sell if problem bulk buyers did not participate, 
which would give the land banks an opportunity to take these nonselling 
properties as soon as the foreclosure sale ended. See David Muller, Wayne 
County Adds June Auction to Massive Tax Foreclosed Property Sale Noted 
by Detroit Blight Removal Task Force, MLive (Oct. 22, 2012, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.mlive.com/business/detroit/index.ssf/2014/05/wayne_county 
_adds_june_auction.html [https://perma.cc/6C2X-DVKT]. 
157. See supra Part IV (explaining how the Michigan legislature is restricting 
auction participation to nondelinquent buyers, with different time restrictions 
for homeowner-occupants versus employees of real estate companies). 
158. See id. (explaining the provisions of the new affidavit program). 
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to preemptively fight back against repeat offenders.159 Actual enforce-
ment of affidavit discrepancies may prove difficult due to the number 
of properties and bidders the County manages in each sale. Still, this 
method has at least greater potential for practicability than a more in-
depth vetting process,160 and would still likely take less resources than 
Wayne County and its land banks will use taking in more than 20,000 
properties from previous problem buyers. 
Unfortunately, the affidavit solution may still put a greater strain 
on individual, financially limited homeowner-occupants than it will on 
savvy serial investors. Investors may create new business entities each 
auction to avoid detection as the same problematic buyer. Owner-occu-
pant homebuyers—who may not have even had the resources to comp-
lete a title search—will not have the same resources or know-how to 
circumvent the system.161 Hiding behind new entity names is not a 
foolproof means of buying without detection, but it could at least buy 
an investor some time to take on properties and earn rent or sell before 
being detected. Additionally, a perjury charge may not be enough to 
motivate an investor to answer truthfully about previous foreclosure 
actions, depending on the volume and income generated by their delin-
quencies.162 With this new affidavit rule, because the buyer must swear 
that they have not been involved in a foreclosure in the last taxable 
year, an individual homeowner who has lost his or her home to fore-
closure and failed to reclaim it during the redemption period cannot 
come through the auction to repurchase the home and wipe the tax bill 
 
159. Livengood, supra note 131. 
160. When a tax-collecting government is dealing with large volumes of sale 
properties, it is unreasonable to expect that government to be able to 
individually vet each buyer. See Sarah Cwiek, The 2014 Wayne County 
Tax Foreclosure Auction is Over, but Key Details Slow to Emerge, Mich. 
Radio (Oct. 29, 2014), http://michiganradio.org/post/2014-wayne-county- 
tax-auction-over-key-details-slow-emerge [https://perma.cc/BVM7-3TR8] 
(noting that approximately 24,000 properties sold in the final round of Wayne 
County’s tax foreclosure auction). Even in less distressed markets, the affidavit 
can keep the buyer responsible or being truthful even if the tax-collecting 
government misses something when inquiring into the auction participants 
before the sale. 
161. See, e.g., Frank Ford, Senior Policy Advisor, Thriving Cmtys. Inst., Cuyahoga 
County Housing Issues: In the Shadow of the Foreclosure Crisis (June 27, 2014), 
organizeohio.org/uploads/2/8/7/7/2877533/ford.pptx (providing one example 
of bulk buyers using different names and fake addresses to evade detection 
as problem buyers in Cuyahoga County). 
162. As discussed in Mallach, supra note 4, if one of the high-volume flippers’ or 
milkers’ potential income is great without many resources expended up front, 
a perjury charge may not tip the scale enough to make bulk buying a losing 
deal. 
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clean,163 The new interest rate reductions have the potential to help to 
keep at least some homeowners from getting to such a desperate situ-
ation,164 but issues communicating with taxpayers about available assis-
tance programs165 may still put owner-occupants at a disadvantage as 
compared to the more savvy investors. While a tax-collecting govern-
ment should put its owner-occupant citizens first in its solutions to tax 
auction problems, it should not do so at the expense of other taxpayers 
as the Wayne County loophole did.166 
B. Reversing Blight 
A forward-thinking abandoned property auction should include an 
agreement that explicitly defines what the tax-collecting government 
expects to be done to the property, and the standards by which perfor-
mance on improving the property will be judged.167 These requirements 
should also include the timetables by which the purchaser must com-
plete the agreed-upon tasks, and the method by which the government 
will enforce the requirements.168 This may include a reverter right, 
where the government can take the property back upon nonperform-
ance.169 The Michigan Chronicle described the reverter clauses as means 
to “address the fight against blighted neighborhoods and property neg-
lect by speculators.”170 When used in other community development 
contexts, the reverter rights are usually tied to land improvements.171 
Wayne County has taken them a step further by also requiring timely 
property tax payment. Because properties going up for sale in these 
tax-foreclosure auctions are likely to be “concentrated . . . in the areas 
 
163. Supra Part IV (explaining how the new affidavit program has closed Wayne 
County’s previous tax delinquency loophole). 
164. See, e.g., supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (providing some insight 
on past auction buyers who used the auction as a means to wipe out old tax 
debt). 
165. Anecdotally, those arguing for a tax foreclosure moratorium have referenced 
homeowners who are not getting assistance, even though they should qualify 
for one or more of the programs available through the county. See Sarah 
Cwiek, Wayne County Extends Foreclosure Deadline as Protestors Call for 
Moratorium, Mich. Radio (June 8, 2015), http://michiganradio.org/post/ 
wayne-county-extends-foreclosure-deadline-protesters-call-moratorium# 
stream/0 [https://perma.cc/LQ92-KH4W] (citing hardship and property 
exemptions).  
166. MacDonald, supra note 57. 
167. Mallach, supra note 15, at 115. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. A Talk with Wayne County Treasurer, supra note 41. 
171. Supra Part III.B. 
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where disinvestment and vacancy were greatest,”172 the potential for 
continual blight post-sale is high. Foreclosure sale purchases themselves 
may even cause blight, as bulk buyers tend to dominate, picking up 
high volumes of low-price homes.173 “This means that purchase at auc-
tion by investors with a record of blight violations and nonpayment of 
taxes could speed neighborhood disinvestment.”174 With these facts in 
mind, a tax-collecting government should at least consider a plan to 
ensure proper care and renovations of auction properties, whether 
through post-sale consequences or presale qualifications. 
Land banks are effective vehicles for redirecting troubled properties 
to more productive uses, but land banks do have limits on the number 
of properties they can handle effectively. This capacity issue was most 
evident in the Wayne County example, as Wayne County had more 
than 20,000 properties that would probably best be served through the 
land bank but could not all realistically transfer. The Detroit Land 
Bank Authority’s representative shared its concerns about taking in 
high volumes of problem auction properties with Detroit Free Press 
after the treasurer announced it was extending the deadline for repay-
ment on the reverted properties.175 As of November 2014, the Detroit 
Land Bank Authority held 34,000 properties, and was set to receive 
6,000 more in January 2015, not including any of the reverter proper-
ties. Even though the Wayne County-area land banks have specialized 
expertise in dealing with large numbers of problem properties,176 these 
professionals found the 20,000 reverter properties to be a daunting add-
ition. As such, other tax-collecting governments may find a similar 
struggle in bulk-returned tax delinquent auction sales, even if the num-
ber of delinquent properties is much lower than Wayne County’s. 
C. Halting delinquency or Preventing Future Delinquency 
The need to stop tax delinquency is two-fold: tax delinquency of 
course limits local government funding for service, but research suggests 
stopping tax delinquency is also a means to prevent and mitigate bli-
ght.177 Tax-collecting governments considering additional measures to 
 
172. Supra Part III.B. 
173. Dewar, Seymour & Druta, supra note 1, at 605 (noting that from 2002 through 
2010, eleven buyers, each who purchased more than eighty properties, had 
purchased twenty-four percent of all of the auction sale properties). 
174. Id. at 595. 
175. Supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
176. Wayne County and the Detroit area are dealing with some of the highest rates 
of tax foreclosure in their region of the United States. Weise, supra note 36. 
177. Thriving Communities Report, supra note 13, at 6–8, 30, 33, 37, 40 
(discussing general governmental concerns regarding tax delinquent homes; 
also providing empirical data from Cleveland, Ohio describing home value 
reductions between 1.6 and 4 percent for each additional tax-delinquent 
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prevent tax delinquency in auction properties may prevent some issues 
by targeting suspected problem buyers before the sale, but the post-sale 
reverter is the fastest way to stop post-sale delinquency as soon as it 
sets in. 
Particularly when dealing with flippers or milkers, a tax-collecting 
government will likely need to foreclose on the same property again 
after the normal procedural timeframe, generally two to three years.178 
If properties are already in problematic conditions and if governments 
desperately need the property tax income, the extra wait for a second 
foreclosure could make the difference between saving a neighborhood 
block and watching it slide further into blight. Past Wayne County 
Treasurer Raymond Wojtowicz called the reverter clause “the best way 
to break the cycle.”179 In theory, the treasurer is right. When enforced 
in a timely fashion, reverter provisions like Wayne County’s will dram-
atically reduce wait time for nonpaying auction purchases. Within 
thirty days of nonpayment, Wayne County could in theory direct the 
property to the land bank.180 However, the properties facing reverter in 
Wayne County were delinquent for varying lengths of time up until the 
August 2014 Third Circuit case. Following the court’s approval of the 
reverter, the properties will remain in the hands of the delinquent buy-
ers at least until May 2015,181 marking almost an entire year of the 
properties remaining delinquent and in limbo. By the time these prop-
erties make it to the land bank, a normal judicial foreclosure may have 
been the more expedient option. 
Given the potential uncertainties, if the government has no way to 
know the buyer will be delinquent, reverter may still be the best option. 
However, for those buyers the government has reason to believe may 
cause problems, a more preemptive approach may be preferable. While 
reverter programs require waiting for property owners to fall back  
 
structure located within 500 feet of a home, depending on the level of market 
function in the area, with even greater value reductions when the tax-
delinquent structures are also vacant).  
178. MacDonald, supra note 38; see also Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, Real Property 
Tax Forfeiture and Foreclosures, http://www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,4676,7- 
238-43535_55601---,00.html [https://perma.cc/FYW9-9PSW] (noting that in 
Michigan, properties forfeit to the county after the second year of nonpayment, 
and the county forecloses on the properties if the balance is not paid by 
March 31 of the following year). 
179. Marlon A. Walker, Wayne County Treasurer Suing to Recover Homes of 
Tax Scofflaws, Detroit Free Press (June 23, 2014), http://archive.freep. 
com/article/20140623/NEWS02/306230016/wayne-county-tax-sale [https:// 
perma.cc/DDY9-429X].  
180. See supra Part III.A (describing the terms of the Wayne County reverter 
provision). 
181. See supra Part III.A. 
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into delinquency, presale measures provide an opportunity for the tax-
collecting government to reach out to struggling taxpayers before they 
lose control of tax payments.182 Particularly in areas of high delinquen-
cy, like Wayne County, this presale measure may be more useful. 
Looking at delinquency over the long term, the reverter program 
may not serve as a real deterrent for tax delinquency in future auction 
purchases in the same way a presale affidavit could. According to Alex-
ander, homeowners become delinquent on property taxes in three situ-
ations: (1) when the economy causes property values and income levels 
to drop, and the assessed value of properties for tax purposes no longer 
reflects the actual values; (2) when property tax is higher than what 
the general public will tolerate, and the citizens choose not to pay in 
protest; and (3) when investors choose to maximize income and mini-
mize expenses for the property by foregoing property tax payments.183 
Alm et al. suggest that tax delinquency in Detroit in many cases is 
a calculated plan for tax evasion based on knowledge of the system and 
how likely or unlikely it is that they would lose the property for nonpay-
ment.184 Whydontweownthis.com, an online database described by 
Wayne County’s then-deputy treasurer as the most reliable source of 
information on abandoned properties and foreclosures,185 identified sev-
eral bulk buyers who are tens of thousands of dollars behind on taxes. 
These investors may either flip the property later, or simply let the 
property fall back into tax foreclosure after making a profit on the 
rental payments.186 The Detroit News investigated such bulk buyers, 
and found business organizations, from across the country and inter-
nationally, picking up foreclosed homes, and selling them between var-
ious other organizations, raising the price each time, but never actually 
improving the quality of the home.187 
The number of out-of-state buyers in the tax foreclosure auction 
went up significantly when the auctions switched from in person to 
 
182. Dewar, Seymour & Druta, supra note 1, at 596. 
183. Alexander, supra note 17, at 749. 
184. Alm, Hodge, Sands & Skidmore, supra note 34, at 9. 
185. Nick Carey, Cheap Detroit Houses Scooped Up by Investors Can Be Costly 
for Communities, Bad News for Buyers, Huffington Post (Sept. 2, 
2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/03/cheap-detroit- 
houses_n_3538213.html [https://perma.cc/CDL4-Z8TG] (noting, however, 
that some “benevolent speculators” also have begun buying property in 
Detroit, intending to make more beneficial investments in Detroit’s neighbor-
hoods). 
186. Id. 
187. Christine MacDonald, Out-of-state Real Estate Owners Spark Complaints 
from Detroit Area Activists, Detroit News (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www. 
detroitnews.com/article/20110203/METRO01/102030369&template=art
iphone [https://perma.cc/EXG5-EP8H].  
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online. In 2008, four percent of foreclosure purchasers were from out of 
state.188 In 2010, immediately following the first online Wayne County 
auction, that number increased to fifteen percent, and included some 
out-of-the-country investors from Singapore and Australia.189 These in-
vestors will not likely ever see the properties they have purchased.190 If 
implemented without delay, reverters would allow the tax-collecting 
government to reduce the financial benefit of nonpayment and deter 
these investors, as these bulk buyers would have a shorter ownership 
period to derive income from the property. If consistently enforced, this 
may eventually deter these investors. However, if a tax-collecting gov-
ernment has any doubt about its ability to quickly and consistently use 
the provision, a presale measure to limit participation would likely yield 
better protection for the government’s tax income. 
While the more seasoned bulk buyers use knowledge of the tax 
system to get the most value out of nonpayment, unsophisticated pur-
chasers may opt not to pay their taxes because of a lack of understand-
ing of the system. To give owner-occupants a fair chance at successfully 
paying taxes on auction properties, tax-collecting governments may 
consider greater education as part of the presale program. Some home-
owners underestimate future property taxes and find themselves with 
bills they cannot afford.191 Much of this problem may stem from the 
purchaser’s view of the value of the property versus the actual assessed 
tax value of the land. According to Alm et al., Detroit property taxes 
are more than twice the average of the rest of the state of Michigan, 
with homestead property tax rates at 3.257 percent of home value.192 
Citing Hodge, Alm et al., explained that property values in Detroit are 
overassessed by at least five times, and the slow and problematic pro-
cessing system for tax bills creates barriers for successful tax collect-
ion193 One homeowner who lost his property in the 2014 reverter enfor-
cement supports these assertions. Larry Sargent explained to the 
Detroit News that he would be happy to pay property tax were it based 
on a more proper assessment of the home’s value. He purchased the  
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Alm, Hodge, Sands & Skidmore, supra note 34, at 3–4 (citing Sebastien 
Bradley, Property Tax Salience and Payment Delinquency, (Drexel University, 
Working Paper 2013) http://www.bus.umich.edu/ConferenceFiles/MTAXI-
2012/tax_delinquency_draft_May2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P3S-HRKH]. 
192. Id. at 7. 
193. Id. at 8 (citing Timothy R. Hodge, Mark Skidmore, Gary Sands & Daniel 
McMillen, Assessment Inequity in a Declining Housing Market: The Case 
of Detroit (Michigan State University, Working Paper 2013), https://www. 
bostonfed.org/economic/nesg/papers/hodge-skidmore-sands-mcmillen.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24L2-97X4]). 
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home in the 2013 tax foreclosure auction for $500, and he felt as such 
the $22,000 assessment price is much too high.194 
Conclusion 
Even as some housing markets begin to bounce back, unscrupulous 
investors and unprepared new owner-occupants remain a threat to local 
governments’ successes in putting tax delinquent properties to product-
ive use. Local governments may choose to combat these issues before 
the sale, with seemingly positive results, or the government may opt to 
target the issue post-sale. If a local government elects as post-sale re-
verter approach, the government must be certain it has written the 
deed in a way that will clearly establish the defeasible fee and possibility 
of reverter and the government must be able to act quickly and decisive-
ly to repossess the property without creating any of the potential issues 
that could come with delay. A quick-moving and clearly communicated 
reverter program has the potential to successfully address blight before 
it happens. Even when the program is legally sound, tax-collecting gov-
ernments should consider the long-term societal consequences of act- 
ing quickly to remove delinquent buyers. The government must decide 
whether the burden it may place on uneducated, low-income buyers is 
worth the chance to stop the more sophisticated buyers trying to game 
the system. 
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